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Abstract
Despite having excellent performances for a wide
variety of tasks, modern neural networks are un-
able to provide a reliable confidence value allow-
ing to detect misclassifications. This limitation
is at the heart of what is known as an adversarial
example, where the network provides a wrong pre-
diction associated with a strong confidence to a
slightly modified image. Moreover, this overcon-
fidence issue has also been observed for regular
errors and out-of-distribution data. We tackle this
problem by what we call introspection, i.e. using
the information provided by the logits of an al-
ready pretrained neural network. We show that
by training a simple 3-layers neural network on
top of the logit activations, we are able to detect
misclassifications at a competitive level.
1. Introduction
Thanks to their excellent performances, Neural Networks
(NN) are now used to tackle important problems such as
medical diagnosis (Shen et al., 2017) or pedestrian detection
for autonomous cars (Tian et al., 2015). However, regard-
ing classification, one of the issues that prevent widespread
adoption of such solutions is their overconfidence in their
predictions (Amodei et al., 2016). It has been observed
that they can provide high confidence values for errors
(Guo et al., 2017), out-of-distribution examples such as tai-
lored noise (Nguyen et al., 2015) and adversarial examples
(Szegedy et al., 2014).
As explained in (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2017), the main
reason for these high confidence values is the softmax layer
that is usually used as the last layer of a classification NN.
As the softmax is a smooth approximation of the indicator
function, it is designed to output high maximum values,
even for small differences in the logits, i.e the final activation
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values of a classification NN before the softmax function
is applied. We argue that one additional problem is that
by normalizing the logits in order to obtain a probability
distribution, we lose the information about their absolute
values. In this work, we focus on studying whether this
information can be used to compute a confidence value that
would allow to detect errors, out-of-distribution data and
adversarial examples.
Recently, several works focused on detecting misclassifica-
tions. In (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2017), the authors proposed
a baseline method that uses a threshold on softmax probabil-
ities. They also provided some guidelines about how out-of-
distribution data detection experiments should be conducted
and evaluated. In (Jiang et al., 2018), the Trust Score, a spe-
cific 1-NN ratio applied on a filtered version of the training
set, is presented in order to recognize misclassified exam-
ples. In (Liang et al., 2017), the authors introduced ODIN,
a method that separates in and out-of-distribution examples
by preprocessing the input using adversarial perturbation
and then thresholding the softmax scores computed after
temperature scaling.
In this paper, we present Introspection-Net, a simple 3 lay-
ers regression NN that takes the logits as input and aims at
predicting the confidence value, i.e. whether the classifica-
tion is correct (output value of 1) or not (output value of 0).
We show that, by using adversarial training and data aug-
mentation, we are able to detect misclassifications at a com-
petitive level, as we outperform the Trust Score approach
(Jiang et al., 2018) and the Softmax Baseline presented in
(Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2017). The main contribution of this
paper is to show that logits of already pretrained network
provide relevant information to detect adversarial examples
and other types of misclassfications.
2. Setup and Analysis
In this Section, we show through experiments on the MNIST
dataset (LeCun et al.) that there are significant differences
in logit activations between correctly classified examples
and several kinds of misclassifications.
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Table 1. Architecture of the NN trained on MNIST. The final accuracy on the test set is 99.65%.
LAYER TYPE PATCH SIZE STRIDE DEPTH PADDING ACTIVATION OUTPUT SIZE
CONVOLUTION 3X3 1 32 NONE RELU 26X26X32
CONVOLUTION 3X3 1 32 NONE RELU 24X24X32
MAX POOLING 2X2 2 12X12X32
DROPOUT (20%) 12X12X32
CONVOLUTION 3X3 1 64 SAME RELU 12X12X64
CONVOLUTION 3X3 1 64 SAME RELU 12X12X64
MAX POOLING 2X2 2 6X6X64
DROPOUT (25%) 6X6X64
CONVOLUTION 3X3 1 128 SAME RELU 6X6X128
DROPOUT (25%) 6X6X128
FLATTEN 4608
DENSE RELU 128
BATCH NORMALIZATION 128
DROPOUT (25%) 128
DENSE SOFTMAX 10
2.1. Baseline NN Architecture and Training
For these experiments, we train a simple custom NN using
the Keras framework (Chollet et al., 2015). The architecture
is described in Table 1. The training was done for 30 epochs.
We used the RMSprop optimizer, a batch size of 64 and data
augmentation (i.e. slight rotations, zooms and shifts). After
the training, this NN achieves 99.65% accuracy on the test
set.
2.2. Generating misclassified examples
In order to study how logits are distributed for different
kinds of misclassifications (i.e. errors, out-of-distribution
and adversarial examples) compared to original MNIST
images, we use or generate the following datasets:
• For errors, as the performances of state of the art NNs
are close to perfection on MNIST, we use the idea
presented in (DeVries & Taylor, 2018). We generate
misclassified images by adding 7x7 black patches to
test set images. We only keep the ones that are not
classified correctly by the NN.
• For out-of-distribution examples, we study 4 differ-
ent kinds of data. We use random normal and uni-
form noise images, as well as images from CIFAR-10
(Krizhevsky et al., 2014) and Fashion MNIST (Xiao
et al., 2017) datasets.
• For adversarial examples, we use the CleverHans
framework (Papernot et al., 2018). We generate 3
adversarial datasets using different methods: FGSM
(Goodfellow et al., 2015), BIM (Chen & Jordan, 2019)
and DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016). We
only keep the images that are misclassified by the NN.
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Figure 1. Distribution of the average logit values for 1000 exam-
ples of each dataset. It appears clearly that the average logit values
are higher for correctly classified MNIST images compared to
misclassifications.
2.3. Analysis of the difference in logit distributions
Using the NN we described previously, we study whether
logits are distributed differently among the different datasets
we just presented. Figure 1 displays the distribution of
the average logit values for each of them. We can clearly
see that logits values are higher for correctly classified
MNIST images than for any other dataset. These differ-
ences are statistically significant according to the Student’s
t-test (p < 0.0001 between MNIST and any other dataset).
Intuitively, it is sound that out-of-distribution examples are
associated with lower logit values. In fact, it is likely that
previous convolutional layers did not detect the pixel/feature
patterns they were trained on, resulting in weakly activated
feature maps, which in turn leads to lower logit values. It
Detecting Adversarial Examples and Other Misclassifications in Neural Networks by Introspection
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
max logit value
−15.0
−12.5
−10.0
−7.5
−5.0
−2.5
0.0
m
in
lo
g
it
va
lu
e
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
max softmax value
−0.005
−0.004
−0.003
−0.002
−0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
m
in
so
ft
m
a
x
va
lu
e
MNIST
Gaussian
CIFAR-10
FGSM
Errors
Figure 2. Scatterplot of the logit (left) and softmax (right) minimum and maximum values. For visibility reasons, we only display the
values for 300 examples for 5 datasets. It appears that only using these 2 statistics for logits already helps to separate misclassifications
from correct ones. However, the discriminating information is lost once the softmax function is applied. Best viewed in color.
is however interesting to note that the adversarial datasets
are also associated with lower logit values. One explanation
might be that in order to maximize the softmax value for a
target class, it is easier to decrease logit values for the other
classes than to increase the logit value of the adversarial
attack target. This intuition is supported by the fact that the
distribution of the logit max values is significantly higher
for MNIST (16.5± 5.0) than for BIM (10.8± 5.2), FGSM
(8.8±2.6) and DeepFool (3.4±2.3). The same observation
can be made about minimum values, showing that adversar-
ial example generation techniques tend to create images that
are associated with overall lower logit values.
2.4. Discrimination power of logit vs. softmax values
Figure 2 presents a scatterplot of the logit and softmax
minimum and maximum values for the MNIST, Gaussian,
CIFAR-10, FGSM and Errors datasets. Qualitatively, it ap-
pears that these 2 simple statistics for logits are enough to
separate fairly well MNIST examples from the remaining
ones. We can see that correctly classified images tend to
have higher minimum and maximum logit values, which
correlates well with the distributions showed in Figure 1.
However, we can see that the discriminating information
is lost when we apply the softmax function. These obser-
vations confirm that logits, unlike softmax values, provide
relevant information for misclassification detection.
3. Confidence Prediction
3.1. Proposed solution: Introspection-Net
Based on the insights revealed in the previous section,
we train a simple 3 layers regression NN which we call
Introspection-Net since it takes an intermediate layer, the
logits, as input. It aims at predicting the confidence value
associated to a given prediction, i.e. whether it is a correct
(value of 1) or incorrect (value of 0). Introspection-Net is
composed of 3 dense layers with 128 neurons and RELU
activations. The first 2 layers are followed by dropout layers
with a dropout rate of 20%, and the second dropout layer
is also followed by a Batch Normalization layer. We train
the network for 60 epochs using RMSProp to optimize the
mean squared error loss.
3.2. Experimental setup
Experiments: To evaluate our proposition we run the fol-
lowing two experiments. In a first one, we predict the confi-
dence values associated to the predictions made by the NN
we described in the previous Section. In a second one, we
predict the confidence values associated to the predictions
of a Wide Residual Network (Zagoruyko & Komodakis,
2016), with depth 28 and width 8, trained on CIFAR-10. We
use the implementation provided by Keras contrib (Chollet
et al., 2015). We run this second experiment to ensure that
our approach can generalize to several datasets and NN ar-
chitectures. For both experiments, we compare 3 methods:
the Softmax Baseline introduced in (Hendrycks & Gimpel,
2017), the Trust Score (Jiang et al., 2018) and our method.
Evaluation metrics: We use the evaluation framework in-
troduced in (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2017): the Area Under
the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (AUROC), the
Areas Under the Precision-Recall curve (AUPR) for both
the correct (AUPR In) and incorrect (AUPR Out) classes.
In addition, we also compute the False Positive Rate at 95%
True Positive Rate as in (Liang et al., 2017).
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Table 2. Confidence prediction results on MNIST and CIFAR-10. The best result for each metric/experience is in bold.
EXPERIMENT OOD DATASET FPR (95% TPR) AUROC AUPR IN AUPR OUT
SOFTMAX BASELINE / TRUST SCORE / PROPOSED SOLUTION
CUSTOM NETWORK
MNIST
ERRORS 35.4/39.5/35.8 86.3/86.5/87.8 84.0/82.6/82.9 89.6/88.9/90.5
BIM 55.1/44.7/13.8 76.0/89.9/95.8 75.2/90.8/93.8 80.3/88.8/96.8
FGSM 68.1/69.5/8.7 85.6/88.6/97.9 89.6/92.5/98.7 79.0/81.3/96.0
DEEPFOOL 0.0/0.3/2.9 98.1/97.9/98.2 98.9/98.8/98.9 96.2/95.8/96.9
GAUSSIAN 100.0/100.0/0.0 24.1/82.2/100.0 51.8/88.9/100.0 30.0/68.0/100.0
UNIFORM 100.0/37.6/0.0 21.2/95.1/100.0 51.1/97.0/100.0 25.0/87.8/100.0
CIFAR-10 8.8/12.6/0.0 98.4/97.9/99.9 98.6/98.3/99.9 98.1/97.5/99.9
FASHION 23.5/21.8/0.3 93.7/96.0/99.8 92.8/96.1/99.8 94.6/96.0/99.8
WR-28-8
CIFAR-10
ERRORS 78.2/82.9/75.4 67.6/65.8/69.8 67.7/62.1/65.8 68.5/66.6/71.4
BIM 99.9/99.7/7.3 14.4/56.1/97.9 42.7/62.6/96.7 28.6/49.5/98.4
FGSM 71.5/71.2/55.7 89.5/90.7/94.4 93.7/94.8/97.0 80.6/80.4/87.4
DEEPFOOL 50.8/55.8/71.6 95.0/91.0/89.0 97.2/93.9/93.1 89.3/85.4/81.5
GAUSSIAN 24.6/9.2/0.0 96.1/98.4/99.9 97.0/98.7/100.0 95.2/97.7/99.8
UNIFORM 89.4/33.2/0.0 85.6/95.4/99.9 90.4/96.7/100.0 74.9/91.9/99.8
MNIST 47.6/65.4/0.9 92.6/89.0/99.7 94.5/91.4/99.7 90.1/85.3/99.7
FASHION 46.5/50.1/3.3 92.4/90.7/99.1 94.0/91.9/99.0 90.5/88.9/99.1
Data: For both experiments, the training set is composed of
5000 examples belonging to the in-distribution dataset (i.e.
MNIST for experiment 1, and CIFAR-10 for experiment 2),
and of 700 examples of all the remaining datasets presented
in Section 2.2 (adversarial examples and errors are generated
using CIFAR-10 images for experiment 2). These numbers
were chosen in order to have a balanced dataset. From this
data, we use 10% as a validation set. The testing set is
composed of 2000 images of each dataset.
3.3. Results
The experimental results are shown in Table 2. We can
see that our method provides overall significantly better
confidence values than the other methods, regardless of the
in-distribution data and of the chosen NN architecture. It is
however important to keep in mind that the Trust Score has
the advantage to be model-agnostic, unlike our solution.
Regarding the error detection task, all 3 methods obtain
fairly similar results. It is the most challenging task for
our method, as it achieves its worst performances for both
experiments.
Our method performs extremely well on the out-of-
distribution data detection task, as we obtain close to perfect
scores for all datasets (i.e. Gaussian, Uniform, CIFAR-
10/MNIST and Fashion) in both experiments. These results
are a significant improvement over the two other methods.
For instance, in the first experiment we achieve a 0.0% FPR
on the Gaussian dataset while both the Trust Score and the
Softmax Baseline obtain a 100.0% FPR.
Our method also achieves overall better results for adversar-
ial example detection. It is especially striking for the BIM
dataset, as we achieve a 97.6 AUROC in the second experi-
ment compared to 14.4 for the Softmax Baseline and 56.1
for the Trust Score. However, the Baseline Softmax provide
the best results for detecting DeepFool adversarial examples
on CIFAR-10. This is due to the fact that softmax values
are highly discriminative for these examples, as the average
maximum softmax probability is only 54.0% for DeepFool
and 94.8% for correctly classified MNIST images.
4. Conclusion and Perspectives
We have shown through a series of experiments that logits,
unlike softmax probabilities, of already pretrained neural
networks provide relevant information to detect 3 types of
misclassifications: errors, out-of-distribution data and adver-
sarial examples. We have proposed Introspection-Net, a neu-
ral network trained on logit activations to predict whether
a prediction is correct or not. This solution outperformed
by a large margin the Softmax Baseline and the Trust Score
on confidence prediction, without requiring to retrain the
original NN.
Our findings highlight the interest of using Introspection, i.e.
using NN learned internal representations, to detect misclas-
sifications. These results are especially interesting in the
case of adversarial examples detection, since they show that,
although the softmax values are ”fooled” by the adversarial
noise, it is not the case for internal representations such as
logits, even without any additional training procedure.
On the other hand, Inspection-Net does require adversarial
training to learn the logit distributions for different types
of misclassifications, which is one of its main drawbacks.
Consequently, future work involves studying whether one
can detect these misclassifications using only the logits of
in-distribution examples. We are also interested in exploring
whether this method can be used for other applications such
as natural language processing.
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